

СЕКЦІЯ 2  
МОВОЗНАВСТВО  
LANGUAGE STUDIES  
SESSION 2

**Емоційні еквівалентні зв'язки  
в синестетичних висловах**

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У роботі розглядаються семантичні основи двох видів синестезії, які присутні у повсякденній мові. Проявами власне синестезії в лінгвістиці є вирази, що становлять поєднання двох сенсорних слів, значення яких належать до різних сенсорних сфер (напр. *теплий колір*). Фізіономічні синестезії це поєднання слів, що виражають почуття і сприйняття (напр. *веселий колір*). Джерела вказують, що синестетичні зв'язки можуть бути метафоричними - заснованими на схожості або метонімічними - заснованими на суміжності (напр. Каччарі 2008, Маркс 1996). У статті наведено аргументи, які переконують, що власне синестезія та фізіономічна синестезія не є ані метафорою, ані метонімією, але вони становлять лінгвістичні явища, які створені на основі інших семантичних процесів.

Синестетичні вислови, наприклад, *теплий колір* вважаються метонімічними. З когнітивно-семантичної точки зору, цей вид синестезії заснований на асоціативному вченні: об'єкти або явища, які є джерелом тепла (напр. вогонь), як правило зустрічаються поряд з теплими кольорами (напр. червоним). У дитинстві ми вчимося пов'язувати з собою різні сприйняття, які разом відбуваються і ці спільні сенсорні випадки віддзеркалюються у лінгвістичних виразах. У роботі стверджується, що спільна наявність сенсорних слів у синестезії *теплий колір* не виникає з асоціації ідей, але емоційних відчуттів - тобто вона не є закодована концептуально на еквівалентності почуття, яке викликає червоний колір, але є еквівалентним до почуття, яке збуджується тактильним відчуттям тепла.

Стаття наводить припущення, що вирази, яких називають метафоричною синестезією (напр. *веселий колір*, *гострий голос*) не засновані на концептуальних співвідношеннях, які мотивуються схожістю. Почуття радості і візуальні якості ніяк не можуть належати до однієї категорії, замість цього - враження, почуття, які викликаються кольорами, є еквівалентним з почуттям радості або смутку.

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**Affective equivalence relations in  
synaesthetic phrases**

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**Abstract** – *The paper argues that the semantic processes underlying proper (e. g. warm colour) and physiognomic synaesthesias (e. g. cheerful colour) are based not on conceptual mapping, but on affective equivalence relations.*

**Keywords** – idiomatic synaesthesia, proper synaesthesia, physiognomic synaesthesia, metaphor, metonymy, affective equivalence

**I. Introduction**

Synaesthetic expressions can be divided into two groups according to the literature: proper synaesthesias are linguistic expressions which interconnect two sense words belonging to different sensorial domains (e. g. *warm colour*), pseudo-synaesthesias are phrases in which a sense word qualifies a human characteristic, feeling or state of mind (e. g. *soft-hearted*) (P. Dombi 1974).<sup>1</sup> Exists a group of synaesthesias which is at the border-line of proper and pseudo-synaesthesias. These synaesthetic expressions link a sense word and a word expressing a feeling (e. g. *cheerful colour*)<sup>2</sup> – I call these expressions physiognomic synaesthesias. This article tries to describe the semantic processes underlying proper and physiognomic synaesthesias – it is not concerned with the semantic basis of pseudo-synaesthesias.

**II. Affective equivalence relation  
in proper synaesthesias**

Synaesthesias like *warm colour* are considered metonymies based on contiguity (e. g. Cacciari 2008, Marks 1996, Shibuya–Nozawa–Kanamaru 2007). In a cognitive semantic approach synaesthetic metonymies are based on associative learning: in daily experiences some sensations co-occur with other ones – synaesthetic phrases like *warm colour* can be present in language because objects or phenomena emitting warmth (e. g. fire) generally co-occur with warm (red, orange) colours. Sensory co-occurrence does

<sup>1</sup> Pseudo-synaesthesias are called *psychological metaphors* according to some researchers (e. g. Schecter–Broughton 1991: 120).

<sup>2</sup> This type is called *physiognomic metaphor* or *perceptual-affective metaphor* in the works of Western researchers.

not seem a satisfactory explanation for metonymic synaesthesias: it is true that warm colours tend to co-occur with objects or phenomena related to warmth, but the aforementioned idiomatic expressions are easily understood by children (Seitz 2005), who do not come necessarily into contact with fire in order to observe the warmth of it, so they could learn the sensory association of the tactile (warm) and visual (colour) senses. In addition, the question arises: how can we define those colours which cannot be related to phenomena giving off warmth or coldness (e. g. purple) as warm or cold colours? In our opinion the togetherness of the sense words in the synaesthesia *warm colour* is neither given by an associative relation of the senses, nor by conceptual contiguity, but by some felt affective – that is to say, not conceptually and not perceptually coded – equivalence. The motivation that stands at the basis of the synaesthesia *warm colour* is a felt affective correspondence between the affective impression raised by the visual percept of reddishness and the affective impression raised by the tactile sensation.

### III. Affective equivalence in physiognomic synaesthesias

In the case of physiognomic synaesthesias we can speak of the correspondence of a colour and a feeling (e. g. *cheerful colour*). The usage of the word *correspondence* – instead of *similarity* or *analogy* – is not accidental, because we think that these types of synaesthesias cannot be considered metaphors. This is important to emphasize because researchers dealing with synaesthesia subordinate it to metaphor: that is they consider some types of it as a figure of speech based on analogy (Ullmann 1957), or those researchers who investigate linguistic synaesthesia in the framework of cognitive metaphor theory, argue that synaesthesia is metaphor because it has its origins in the perceptual experiences we have as human beings interacting in the world – the similarity criterion is cancelled out of the definition of metaphor (Cacciari 2008, Callejas 2001).

Here we outline the possibility that the expressions called metaphoric synaesthesias are not based on conceptual mappings motivated by similarity or analogy. The feeling of cheerfulness and a visual quality (in the synaesthesia *cheerful colour*) cannot be labeled as similar entities in any way – instead: the impression, the feeling evoked by some colours is equivalent with the feeling of cheerfulness. The equivalency relation underlying the formation of some synaesthesias is neither conceptual, nor conscious – this relation forms mainly intuitively. This kind of intuitivity is not a personal one, it does not refer to subjective affective impressions or colour–feeling associations altering from person to person. The togetherness of the members contracted in a synaesthetic expression is intersubjectively valid. This is confirmed by Graumann (2007) who summarizes the psychological and physiological impressions evoked by different colours by persons participating in different experiments (e. g. Frieling 1968, Heller 2002): e. g. 1. red: a.) psychological impressions – dynamic, active, powerful, desirous; b.) physiological impressions – warm, hot, dry, stimulating and 2.) yellow:

a.) psychological impressions – cheerful, happy, exuberant;  
b.) physiological impressions – warm, light, stimulating  
(Graumann 2007: 132).

### Conclusion

In this paper I tried to present the idea that the togetherness of the constituent members of synaesthetic expressions is not motivated by conceptual or perceptual contiguity or similarity – instead there presumably is a correspondence or equivalency relation between the members. This correspondence is an affective one, that is to say it exists pre-conceptually. At this point our train of thought links to Seitz's (2005) synaesthesia theory: he delimitates synaesthesia from conceptual metaphor, and argues that synaesthetic expressions are so called primary metaphors because they do not form on the basis of more or less conscious mappings but they activate innate perceptual correspondences, so they form in a largely intuitive and non-conscious way. Likewise Seitz, we presume that synaesthesia is not based on conceptual mappings, but – as we have seen – in some type of synaesthesias (e. g. *warm colour*, *cheerful colour*) we cannot speak about neural-perceptual correspondences that manifest in linguistic expressions, instead there can be identified an affective equivalence relation in them. The mappings governing the formation of synaesthetic expressions indeed are not conceptual ones – that is to say they are non-conscious, and form in an intuitive way, but not because they reflect innate neural-perceptual relations, but because in synaesthesias affective representations correspond to each other.

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