The efficacy of economic sanctions in view of alternative coercive instruments between hard and soft power

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dc.citation.conferenceXІI Міжнародна науково-практична конференція "Маркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту"
dc.citation.epage245
dc.citation.journalTitleМаркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту : тези доповідей XІI Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції
dc.citation.spage243
dc.contributor.affiliationКиївський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка
dc.contributor.authorUlmer, M.
dc.coverage.placenameЛьвів
dc.coverage.placenameLviv
dc.coverage.temporal25–27 жовтня 2018 року, Львів
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-05T08:07:12Z
dc.date.available2020-06-05T08:07:12Z
dc.date.created2018-11-25
dc.date.issued2018-11-25
dc.format.extent243-245
dc.format.pages3
dc.identifier.citationUlmer M. The efficacy of economic sanctions in view of alternative coercive instruments between hard and soft power / M. Ulmer // Маркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту : тези доповідей XІI Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції, 25–27 жовтня 2018 року, Львів. — Львів : Видавництво Львівської політехніки, 2018. — С. 243–245.
dc.identifier.citationenUlmer M. The efficacy of economic sanctions in view of alternative coercive instruments between hard and soft power / M. Ulmer // Marketing and logistics in the system of management, 25–27 zhovtnia 2018 roku, Lviv. — Lviv : Vydavnytstvo Lvivskoi politekhniky, 2018. — P. 243–245.
dc.identifier.isbn978-966-941-235-5
dc.identifier.urihttps://ena.lpnu.ua/handle/ntb/51553
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherВидавництво Львівської політехніки
dc.relation.ispartofМаркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту : тези доповідей XІI Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції, 2018
dc.relation.ispartofMarketing and logistics in the system of management, 2018
dc.relation.references1. Addis, A. (2003). Economic sanctions and the problem of evil. Human Rights Quarterly, 573-623.
dc.relation.references2. Allen, S. H., & Lektzian, D. J. (2013). Economic sanctions: A blunt instrument?. Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 121-135.
dc.relation.references3. Baldwin, D. A., & Pape, R. A. (1998). Evaluating economic sanctions. International Security, 23(2), 189-198.
dc.relation.references4. Doxey, M. (1980). Economic sanctions: benefits and costs. The World Today, 36(12), 484-489.
dc.relation.references5. Drury, A. C. (2000). US presidents and the use of economic sanctions. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 30(4), 623-642.
dc.relation.references6. Gompert, D. C., & Binnendijk, H. (2016). The Power to Coerce.
dc.relation.references7. Hovi, J., Huseby, R., & Sprinz, D. F. (2005). When do (imposed) economic sanctions work?. World Politics, 57(4), 479-499.
dc.relation.references8. Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., & Elliott, K. A. (1990). Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy (Vol. 1). Peterson Institute.
dc.relation.references9. Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527. (1981). The prince. Harmondsworth, Eng. ; New York, N.Y. : Penguin Books,
dc.relation.references10. Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological review, 50(4), 370.
dc.relation.references11. Pape, R. A. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International security, 22(2), 90-136.
dc.relation.references12. Pape, R. A. (1998). Why economic sanctions still do not work. International Security, 23(1), 66-77.
dc.relation.references13. Wallensteen, P. (1968). Characteristics of economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research, 5(3), 248-267.
dc.relation.referencesen1. Addis, A. (2003). Economic sanctions and the problem of evil. Human Rights Quarterly, 573-623.
dc.relation.referencesen2. Allen, S. H., & Lektzian, D. J. (2013). Economic sanctions: A blunt instrument?. Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 121-135.
dc.relation.referencesen3. Baldwin, D. A., & Pape, R. A. (1998). Evaluating economic sanctions. International Security, 23(2), 189-198.
dc.relation.referencesen4. Doxey, M. (1980). Economic sanctions: benefits and costs. The World Today, 36(12), 484-489.
dc.relation.referencesen5. Drury, A. C. (2000). US presidents and the use of economic sanctions. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 30(4), 623-642.
dc.relation.referencesen6. Gompert, D. C., & Binnendijk, H. (2016). The Power to Coerce.
dc.relation.referencesen7. Hovi, J., Huseby, R., & Sprinz, D. F. (2005). When do (imposed) economic sanctions work?. World Politics, 57(4), 479-499.
dc.relation.referencesen8. Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., & Elliott, K. A. (1990). Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy (Vol. 1). Peterson Institute.
dc.relation.referencesen9. Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527. (1981). The prince. Harmondsworth, Eng. ; New York, N.Y. : Penguin Books,
dc.relation.referencesen10. Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological review, 50(4), 370.
dc.relation.referencesen11. Pape, R. A. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International security, 22(2), 90-136.
dc.relation.referencesen12. Pape, R. A. (1998). Why economic sanctions still do not work. International Security, 23(1), 66-77.
dc.relation.referencesen13. Wallensteen, P. (1968). Characteristics of economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research, 5(3), 248-267.
dc.rights.holder© Національний університет “Львівська політехніка”, 2018
dc.rights.holder© Ulmer M., 2018
dc.titleThe efficacy of economic sanctions in view of alternative coercive instruments between hard and soft power
dc.typeConference Abstract

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Маркетинг та логістика в системі менеджменту. – 2018 р.