Явище maximal extractable value (MEV) в мережах блокчейн та його вплив на блокчейн екосистему
dc.citation.epage | 71 | |
dc.citation.issue | 2 | |
dc.citation.journalTitle | Український журнал інформаційних технологій | |
dc.citation.spage | 60 | |
dc.citation.volume | 5 | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Національний університет “Львівська політехніка” | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Lviv Polytechnic National University | |
dc.contributor.author | Черкас, Н. С. | |
dc.contributor.author | Батюк, А. Є. | |
dc.contributor.author | Cherkas, N. S. | |
dc.contributor.author | Batiuk, A. Y. | |
dc.coverage.placename | Львів | |
dc.coverage.placename | Lviv | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-04-01T11:06:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-04-01T11:06:11Z | |
dc.date.created | 2023-02-28 | |
dc.date.issued | 2023-02-28 | |
dc.description.abstract | З появою технології смарт контрактів в мережах блокчейн стала можливою реалізація складних протоколів децентралізованих фінансів, які з часом набули значної популярності та досягнули показника Total Value Locked (TVL) в більше ніж 150 мільярдів доларів США. Мережі блокчейн, надаючи такі гарантії як незмінність, відкритість, децентралізованість та безпека, все ж нездатні забезпечити прогнозований порядок транзакцій у вихідних блоках, що стало причиною появи явища Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) – максимальної "екстрактованої" вигоди, доступної певним учасникам мережі (майнерам, валідаторам), які мають ексклюзивну можливість впливати на впорядкування транзакцій. В даній роботі проведено ґрунтовний огляд явища MEV та з'ясовано його вплив на екосистему мереж блокчейн. Окреслено безпосередню проблему прогнозованого порядку транзакцій в мережах блокчейн, проведено огляд значної кількості наукових публікацій за темою екстракції MEV, що дало можливість здійснити ретроспективний аналіз даного явища, систематизувати його найбільш поширені прояви та проаналізувати сучасні тенденції розвитку. В ході ретроспективного аналізу, виявлено паралелі зі схожими маніпуляціями в галузі високочастотної алгоритмізованої торгівлі на класичних фінансових майданчиках та зроблено важливий висновок щодо напрямку вирішення проблеми MEV в протоколах децентралізованих фінансів. Систематизовано напрямки сучасних досліджень явища MEV, проаналізовано методи та засоби досліджень, а також наведено безпосередні приклади екстракції MEV в мережі Ethereum з існуючими оцінками її масштабів. В підсумку, виділено переважаючий негативний вплив явища MEV на мережі блокчейн і децентралізовані фінанси та на основі аналізу окремої підкатегорії існуючих публікацій виявлено відсутність, на даний момент, ефективного рішення проблеми екстракції MEV. Це своєю чергою зумовлює актуальність подальших досліджень в напрямку подолання негативних впливів MEV на мережі блокчейн та протоколи децентралізованих фінансів. | |
dc.description.abstract | The advent of smart contract technology in blockchain networks has ushered in a new era of possibilities for implementing complex decentralized finance protocols. Over time, these protocols have gained significant traction, reaching a Total Value Locked (TVL) of over 150 billion US dollars. While blockchain networks offer inherent benefits such as immutability, transparency, decentralization, and security, they still grapple with a critical challenge – the inability to ensure a predictable order of transactions within produced blocks. This limitation has given rise to the Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) phenomenon. MEV represents the maximum potential benefit that certain network participants, primarily miners and validators, can extract by wielding their exclusive capability to influence transaction order. In this work, we embark on an exhaustive exploration of the MEV phenomenon and delve deep into its impact on the broader blockchain ecosystem. We shed light on the pressing issue of transaction ordering in blockchain networks and provide an in-depth survey of the vast body of scholarly publications focused on MEV extraction. This comprehensive review allowed us to conduct a retrospective analysis of the MEV phenomenon, categorize its most common manifestations, and uncover current development trends. Intriguingly, during this analysis, parallels were drawn with similar manipulations witnessed in the realm of high-frequency algorithmic trading within traditional financial markets. A vital conclusion that emerged from our study pertains to possible strategies for addressing the MEV problem within decentralized finance protocols. We systematically outline the current research directions concerning MEV, explore the methodologies and tools employed in these studies, and present concrete examples of MEV extraction within the Ethereum network, accompanied by quantitative estimations. In summary, the MEV phenomenon has cast an overwhelming negative impact on blockchain networks and decentralized finance. Our analysis of existing publications within a specific subcategory reveals the current absence of an effective solution to the MEV extraction problem. This underscores the importance of further research aimed at mitigating the adverse effects of MEV on blockchain networks and decentralized finance protocols. | |
dc.format.extent | 60-71 | |
dc.format.pages | 12 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Черкас Н. С. Явище maximal extractable value (MEV) в мережах блокчейн та його вплив на блокчейн екосистему / Н. С. Черкас, А. Є. Батюк // Український журнал інформаційних технологій. — Львів : Видавництво Львівської політехніки, 2023. — Том 5. — № 2. — С. 60–71. | |
dc.identifier.citationen | Cherkas N. S. Maximal extractable value (MEV) in blockchain networks and its impact on blockchain ecosys-tem / N. S. Cherkas, A. Y. Batiuk // Ukrainian Journal of Information Technology. — Lviv : Lviv Politechnic Publishing House, 2023. — Vol 5. — No 2. — P. 60–71. | |
dc.identifier.doi | doi.org/10.23939/ujit2023.02.060 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2707-1898 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ena.lpnu.ua/handle/ntb/61605 | |
dc.language.iso | uk | |
dc.publisher | Видавництво Львівської політехніки | |
dc.publisher | Lviv Politechnic Publishing House | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Український журнал інформаційних технологій, 2 (5), 2023 | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Ukrainian Journal of Information Technology, 2 (5), 2023 | |
dc.relation.references | [1] Auer, R., Haslhofer, B., Kitzler, S., Saggese, P., & Friedhelm, V. (n.d.). The Technology of Decentralized Finance (DEFI) Industrial Organization, International Macroeconomics and Finance and Banking and Corporate Finance. Retrieved from: www.cepr.org | |
dc.relation.references | [2] Bancor Is Flawed. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://hackingdi-stributed.com/2017/06/19/bancor-is-flawed/ | |
dc.relation.references | [3] Bancor Network. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://bancor.network/ | |
dc.relation.references | [4] Bartoletti, M., & Zunino, R. (2023). A theoretical basis for Blockchain Extractable Value. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.02154 | |
dc.relation.references | [5] Baum, C., Hsin-yu Chiang, J., David, B., Kasper Frederiksen, T., & Gentile, L. (2021). SoK: Mitigation of Front-running in Decentralized Finance. | |
dc.relation.references | [6] Daian, P., Goldfeder, S., Kell, T., Li, Y., Zhao, X., Bentov, I., Breidenbach, L., & Juels, A. (2019). Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1904.05234 | |
dc.relation.references | [7] Danksharding | ethereum.org. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://-ethereum.org/en/roadmap/danksharding/ | |
dc.relation.references | [8] DEFI Sandwich Attack Explain. In this article, I am going to… | by achinta das | Coinmonks | Medium. (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2023, from: https://medium.com/coinmonks/defi-sandwich-attack-explain-776f6f43b2fd | |
dc.relation.references | [9] Eden Network - Multichain Infrastructure for Maximal Value | Eden Network - Multichain Infrastructure for Maximal Value. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://www.edennetwork.io/ | |
dc.relation.references | [10] Eskandari, S., Moosavi, S., & Clark, J. (2019). SoK: Transparent Dishonesty: front-running attacks on Blockchain. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43725-1_13 | |
dc.relation.references | [11] Ethereum Blocks #10281528 | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/block/10281528 | |
dc.relation.references | [12] Ethereum Blocks #16133912 | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/block/16133912 | |
dc.relation.references | [13] Ethereum is a Dark Forest. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://www.paradigm.xyz/2020/08/ethereum-is-a-dark-forest | |
dc.relation.references | [14] Ethereum Node Tracker | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/nodetracker | |
dc.relation.references | [15] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x0e2c50e60c180b645aa5c62f80-202242ad34b1ba163964999d5f4c9aad2037d0 | |
dc.relation.references | [16] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2ed629dd81fb6c5541402-775fc0217a2df04066cba5f2eb96b1dc53082ddeb6b | |
dc.relation.references | [17] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x50ca4302caf14a4475d-19a4b4cbdd522195136a17dcba68287529be2f21a4fd3 | |
dc.relation.references | [18] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5169bccd1893130995ebc25fa3-74366284b723ded44f379d0977af3f144d1a8f | |
dc.relation.references | [19] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe0c3dcfbb00c03492d1520-a63ecf0a83f4beade2949616054d0f4b19196d79eb | |
dc.relation.references | [20] Fenu, G., Marchesi, L., Marchesi, M., & Tonelli, R. (2018). The ICO phenomenon and its relationships with ethereum smart contract environment. 2018 IEEE 1st International Workshop on Blockchain Oriented Software Engineering, IWBOSE 2018 - Proceedings, 2018-January, 17. https://doi.org/10.1109/IWBOSE.2018.8327568 | |
dc.relation.references | [21] GitHub - flashbots/mev-geth: Go implementation of MEV-Auction for Ethereum. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://github.com/flashbots/mev-geth | |
dc.relation.references | [22] Guo, A. (2023). Invariance properties of maximal extractable value. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.11010 | |
dc.relation.references | [23] Ha, F., & Michellis, D. (2021). MEV on L2. | |
dc.relation.references | [24] Heimbach, L., & Wattenhofer, R. (2022). SoK: Preventing Transaction Reordering Manipulations in Decentralized Finance. https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559784 | |
dc.relation.references | [25] Heimbach, L., Kiffer, L., Torres, C. F., & Wattenhofer, R. (2023). Ethereum's Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.19037 | |
dc.relation.references | [26] Heimbach, L., Zürich, E., Ch, S. H., Wattenhofer, R., & Switzerland, Z. (n.d.). Eliminating Sandwich Attacks with the Help of Game Theory; Eliminating Sandwich Attacks with the Help of Game Theory. ASIA CCS, 15. https://doi.org/10.1145/3488932.3517390 | |
dc.relation.references | [27] Home | Uniswap Protocol. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://uniswap.org/ | |
dc.relation.references | [28] Judmayer, A., Stifter, N., Schindler, P., & Weippl, E. (2021). Estimating (Miner) Extractable Value is Hard, Let's Go Shopping! Retrieved from: https://github.com/ | |
dc.relation.references | [29] L2 MEV wat - Taiko Labs. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://taiko.mirror.xyz/VjNjFws6OOVez5YCDMwjy4BUiDqZBHYDvcW4-JZGDkc | |
dc.relation.references | [30] Lehar, A., & Parlour, C. A. (2023). Battle of the Bots: Flash loans, Miner Extractable Value and Efficient Settlement Battle of the Bots: Flash loans, Miner Extractable Value and Efficient Settlement Preliminary and incomplete. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4382292 | |
dc.relation.references | [31] Lewis, M. (2014). Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt. W.W. Norton & Company. | |
dc.relation.references | [32] Mazorra, B., Reynolds, M., & Daza, V. (2022). Price of MEV: Towards a Game Theoretical Approach to MEV. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2208.13464 | |
dc.relation.references | [33] MEV Explore. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://explore-.flashbots.net/ | |
dc.relation.references | [34] MEV-Boost in a Nutshell. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://boost.flashbots.net/ | |
dc.relation.references | [35] mevboost.pics | MEV-Boost Dashboard. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://mevboost.pics/ | |
dc.relation.references | [36] Nisan, Noam. (2007). Algorithmic game theory. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800481 | |
dc.relation.references | [37] Obadia, A., Salles, A., Sankar, L., Chitra, T., Chellani, V., & Daian, P. (2021). Unity is Strength: A Formalization of Cross-Domain Maximal Extractable Value. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2112.01472 | |
dc.relation.references | [38] Odos. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://www.odos.xyz/arbitrage | |
dc.relation.references | [39] Park, S., Jeong, W., Lee, Y., Son, B., Jang, H., & Lee, J. (2023). Unraveling the MEV Enigma: ABI-Free Detection Model using Graph Neural Networks. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.05952 | |
dc.relation.references | [40] Piet, J., Fairoze, J., & Weaver, N. (2022). Extracting Godl [sic] from the Salt Mines: Ethereum Miners Extracting Value. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2203.15930 | |
dc.relation.references | [41] Poux, P., De Filippi, P., & Deffains, B. (2022). Maximal Extractable Value and the Blockchain Commons. Retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4198139 | |
dc.relation.references | [42] Proposer-builder separation | ethereum.org. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/pbs/ | |
dc.relation.references | [43] Qin, K., Zhou, L., & Gervais, A. (2021). Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest? https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833734 | |
dc.relation.references | [44] Qin, K., Zhou, L., Gamito, P., Jovanovic, P., & Gervais, A. (2021). An Empirical Study of DeFi Liquidations: Incentives, Risks, and Instabilities. https://doi.org/10.1145/3487552.3487811 | |
dc.relation.references | [45] sealaunch.xyz у Твіттері: "A MEV bot is eating your lunch. jaredfro- msubway.eth MEV bot is the top gas ETH spender in the last 24H, spending 455ETH (950 k) and using 7 % of total gas of the network In the last 2 months it spent more than 3.720ETH ($7M) in gas fees and performed more than 180 k transactions https://t.co/IGMJY7skkq" / X. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://twitter.com/SeaLaunch_/status/1648436056717688832 | |
dc.relation.references | [46] State of research: increasing censorship resistance of transactions under proposer/builder separation (PBS) - HackMD. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/pbs_censorship_resistance | |
dc.relation.references | [47] Status - Private, Secure Communication. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://status.im/ | |
dc.relation.references | [48] Swap - Curve. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://-curve.fi/#/ethereum/swap | |
dc.relation.references | [49] The Merge | ethereum.org. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/merge/ | |
dc.relation.references | [50] Torres, C. F., Camino, R., & State, R. (2021). Frontrunner Jones and the Raiders of the Dark Forest: An Empirical Study of Frontrunning on the Ethereum Blockchain. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2102.03347 | |
dc.relation.references | [51] Transaction Flow Chart | EigenTx:0xb55d4267a3565fdc8bada2638f97ed0bb3- 1aa40bf8d4b304086dbdc1ca7d7844. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://eigenphi.io/mev/eigentx/0xb55d4267a3565fdc8bada2638f97ed0bb31aa4... | |
dc.relation.references | [52] Wahrstätter, A., Zhou, L., Qin, K., Svetinovic, D., & Gervais, A. (2023). Time to Bribe: Measuring Block Construction Markets. | |
dc.relation.references | [53] Weintraub, B., Torres, C. F., Nita-Rotaru, C., & State, R. (2022). A Flash (bot) in the Pan: Measuring Maximal Extractable Value in Private Pools. https://doi.org/10.1145/3517745.3561448 | |
dc.relation.references | [54] Werner, S. M., Perez, D., Gudgeon, L., Klages-Mundt, A., Harz, D., & Knottenbelt, W. J. (2021). SoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi). https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559780 | |
dc.relation.references | [55] What is MEV Anyway? - Coin Metrics. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://coinmetrics.io/special-insights/what-is-mev-anyway/ | |
dc.relation.references | [56] Yang, S., Zhang, F., Huang, K., Chen, X., Yang, Y., & Zhu, F. (2022). SoK: MEV Countermeasures: Theory and Practice. Retrieved from: https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.05111 | |
dc.relation.references | [57] Zhou, L., Qin, K., & Gervais, A. (2021). A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.07371 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [1] Auer, R., Haslhofer, B., Kitzler, S., Saggese, P., & Friedhelm, V. (n.d.). The Technology of Decentralized Finance (DEFI) Industrial Organization, International Macroeconomics and Finance and Banking and Corporate Finance. Retrieved from: www.cepr.org | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [2] Bancor Is Flawed. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://hackingdi-stributed.com/2017/06/19/bancor-is-flawed/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [3] Bancor Network. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://bancor.network/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [4] Bartoletti, M., & Zunino, R. (2023). A theoretical basis for Blockchain Extractable Value. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.02154 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [5] Baum, C., Hsin-yu Chiang, J., David, B., Kasper Frederiksen, T., & Gentile, L. (2021). SoK: Mitigation of Front-running in Decentralized Finance. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [6] Daian, P., Goldfeder, S., Kell, T., Li, Y., Zhao, X., Bentov, I., Breidenbach, L., & Juels, A. (2019). Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1904.05234 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [7] Danksharding | ethereum.org. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://-ethereum.org/en/roadmap/danksharding/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [8] DEFI Sandwich Attack Explain. In this article, I am going to… | by achinta das | Coinmonks | Medium. (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2023, from: https://medium.com/coinmonks/defi-sandwich-attack-explain-776f6f43b2fd | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [9] Eden Network - Multichain Infrastructure for Maximal Value | Eden Network - Multichain Infrastructure for Maximal Value. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://www.edennetwork.io/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [10] Eskandari, S., Moosavi, S., & Clark, J. (2019). SoK: Transparent Dishonesty: front-running attacks on Blockchain. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43725-1_13 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [11] Ethereum Blocks #10281528 | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/block/10281528 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [12] Ethereum Blocks #16133912 | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/block/16133912 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [13] Ethereum is a Dark Forest. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://www.paradigm.xyz/2020/08/ethereum-is-a-dark-forest | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [14] Ethereum Node Tracker | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/nodetracker | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [15] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x0e2c50e60c180b645aa5c62f80-202242ad34b1ba163964999d5f4c9aad2037d0 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [16] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2ed629dd81fb6c5541402-775fc0217a2df04066cba5f2eb96b1dc53082ddeb6b | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [17] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x50ca4302caf14a4475d-19a4b4cbdd522195136a17dcba68287529be2f21a4fd3 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [18] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5169bccd1893130995ebc25fa3-74366284b723ded44f379d0977af3f144d1a8f | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [19] Ethereum Transaction Hash (Txhash) Details | Etherscan. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe0c3dcfbb00c03492d1520-a63ecf0a83f4beade2949616054d0f4b19196d79eb | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [20] Fenu, G., Marchesi, L., Marchesi, M., & Tonelli, R. (2018). The ICO phenomenon and its relationships with ethereum smart contract environment. 2018 IEEE 1st International Workshop on Blockchain Oriented Software Engineering, IWBOSE 2018 - Proceedings, 2018-January, 17. https://doi.org/10.1109/IWBOSE.2018.8327568 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [21] GitHub - flashbots/mev-geth: Go implementation of MEV-Auction for Ethereum. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://github.com/flashbots/mev-geth | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [22] Guo, A. (2023). Invariance properties of maximal extractable value. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.11010 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [23] Ha, F., & Michellis, D. (2021). MEV on L2. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [24] Heimbach, L., & Wattenhofer, R. (2022). SoK: Preventing Transaction Reordering Manipulations in Decentralized Finance. https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559784 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [25] Heimbach, L., Kiffer, L., Torres, C. F., & Wattenhofer, R. (2023). Ethereum's Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.19037 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [26] Heimbach, L., Zürich, E., Ch, S. H., Wattenhofer, R., & Switzerland, Z. (n.d.). Eliminating Sandwich Attacks with the Help of Game Theory; Eliminating Sandwich Attacks with the Help of Game Theory. ASIA CCS, 15. https://doi.org/10.1145/3488932.3517390 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [27] Home | Uniswap Protocol. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://uniswap.org/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [28] Judmayer, A., Stifter, N., Schindler, P., & Weippl, E. (2021). Estimating (Miner) Extractable Value is Hard, Let's Go Shopping! Retrieved from: https://github.com/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [29] L2 MEV wat - Taiko Labs. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://taiko.mirror.xyz/VjNjFws6OOVez5YCDMwjy4BUiDqZBHYDvcW4-JZGDkc | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [30] Lehar, A., & Parlour, C. A. (2023). Battle of the Bots: Flash loans, Miner Extractable Value and Efficient Settlement Battle of the Bots: Flash loans, Miner Extractable Value and Efficient Settlement Preliminary and incomplete. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4382292 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [31] Lewis, M. (2014). Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt. W.W. Norton & Company. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [32] Mazorra, B., Reynolds, M., & Daza, V. (2022). Price of MEV: Towards a Game Theoretical Approach to MEV. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2208.13464 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [33] MEV Explore. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://explore-.flashbots.net/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [34] MEV-Boost in a Nutshell. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://boost.flashbots.net/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [35] mevboost.pics | MEV-Boost Dashboard. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://mevboost.pics/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [36] Nisan, Noam. (2007). Algorithmic game theory. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800481 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [37] Obadia, A., Salles, A., Sankar, L., Chitra, T., Chellani, V., & Daian, P. (2021). Unity is Strength: A Formalization of Cross-Domain Maximal Extractable Value. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2112.01472 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [38] Odos. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://www.odos.xyz/arbitrage | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [39] Park, S., Jeong, W., Lee, Y., Son, B., Jang, H., & Lee, J. (2023). Unraveling the MEV Enigma: ABI-Free Detection Model using Graph Neural Networks. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.05952 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [40] Piet, J., Fairoze, J., & Weaver, N. (2022). Extracting Godl [sic] from the Salt Mines: Ethereum Miners Extracting Value. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2203.15930 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [41] Poux, P., De Filippi, P., & Deffains, B. (2022). Maximal Extractable Value and the Blockchain Commons. Retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4198139 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [42] Proposer-builder separation | ethereum.org. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/pbs/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [43] Qin, K., Zhou, L., & Gervais, A. (2021). Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest? https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833734 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [44] Qin, K., Zhou, L., Gamito, P., Jovanovic, P., & Gervais, A. (2021). An Empirical Study of DeFi Liquidations: Incentives, Risks, and Instabilities. https://doi.org/10.1145/3487552.3487811 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [45] sealaunch.xyz u Tvitteri: "A MEV bot is eating your lunch. jaredfro- msubway.eth MEV bot is the top gas ETH spender in the last 24H, spending 455ETH (950 k) and using 7 % of total gas of the network In the last 2 months it spent more than 3.720ETH ($7M) in gas fees and performed more than 180 k transactions https://t.co/IGMJY7skkq", X. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://twitter.com/SeaLaunch_/status/1648436056717688832 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [46] State of research: increasing censorship resistance of transactions under proposer/builder separation (PBS) - HackMD. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/pbs_censorship_resistance | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [47] Status - Private, Secure Communication. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://status.im/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [48] Swap - Curve. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://-curve.fi/#/ethereum/swap | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [49] The Merge | ethereum.org. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/merge/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [50] Torres, C. F., Camino, R., & State, R. (2021). Frontrunner Jones and the Raiders of the Dark Forest: An Empirical Study of Frontrunning on the Ethereum Blockchain. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2102.03347 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [51] Transaction Flow Chart | EigenTx:0xb55d4267a3565fdc8bada2638f97ed0bb3- 1aa40bf8d4b304086dbdc1ca7d7844. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://eigenphi.io/mev/eigentx/0xb55d4267a3565fdc8bada2638f97ed0bb31aa4... | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [52] Wahrstätter, A., Zhou, L., Qin, K., Svetinovic, D., & Gervais, A. (2023). Time to Bribe: Measuring Block Construction Markets. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [53] Weintraub, B., Torres, C. F., Nita-Rotaru, C., & State, R. (2022). A Flash (bot) in the Pan: Measuring Maximal Extractable Value in Private Pools. https://doi.org/10.1145/3517745.3561448 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [54] Werner, S. M., Perez, D., Gudgeon, L., Klages-Mundt, A., Harz, D., & Knottenbelt, W. J. (2021). SoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi). https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559780 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [55] What is MEV Anyway? - Coin Metrics. (n.d.). Retrieved August 13, 2023, from: https://coinmetrics.io/special-insights/what-is-mev-anyway/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [56] Yang, S., Zhang, F., Huang, K., Chen, X., Yang, Y., & Zhu, F. (2022). SoK: MEV Countermeasures: Theory and Practice. Retrieved from: https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.05111 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | [57] Zhou, L., Qin, K., & Gervais, A. (2021). A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges. Retrieved from: http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.07371 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://hackingdi-stributed.com/2017/06/19/bancor-is-flawed/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://bancor.network/ | |
dc.relation.uri | http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.02154 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1904.05234 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://-ethereum.org/en/roadmap/danksharding/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://medium.com/coinmonks/defi-sandwich-attack-explain-776f6f43b2fd | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.edennetwork.io/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43725-1_13 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://etherscan.io/block/10281528 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://etherscan.io/block/16133912 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.paradigm.xyz/2020/08/ethereum-is-a-dark-forest | |
dc.relation.uri | https://etherscan.io/nodetracker | |
dc.relation.uri | https://etherscan.io/tx/0x0e2c50e60c180b645aa5c62f80-202242ad34b1ba163964999d5f4c9aad2037d0 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2ed629dd81fb6c5541402-775fc0217a2df04066cba5f2eb96b1dc53082ddeb6b | |
dc.relation.uri | https://etherscan.io/tx/0x50ca4302caf14a4475d-19a4b4cbdd522195136a17dcba68287529be2f21a4fd3 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5169bccd1893130995ebc25fa3-74366284b723ded44f379d0977af3f144d1a8f | |
dc.relation.uri | https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe0c3dcfbb00c03492d1520-a63ecf0a83f4beade2949616054d0f4b19196d79eb | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1109/IWBOSE.2018.8327568 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://github.com/flashbots/mev-geth | |
dc.relation.uri | http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.11010 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559784 | |
dc.relation.uri | http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.19037 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1145/3488932.3517390 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://uniswap.org/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://github.com/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://taiko.mirror.xyz/VjNjFws6OOVez5YCDMwjy4BUiDqZBHYDvcW4-JZGDkc | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4382292 | |
dc.relation.uri | http://arxiv.org/abs/2208.13464 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://explore-.flashbots.net/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://boost.flashbots.net/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://mevboost.pics/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800481 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2112.01472 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.odos.xyz/arbitrage | |
dc.relation.uri | http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.05952 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2203.15930 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://ssrn.com/abstract=4198139 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/pbs/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833734 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1145/3487552.3487811 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://t.co/IGMJY7skkq | |
dc.relation.uri | https://twitter.com/SeaLaunch_/status/1648436056717688832 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/pbs_censorship_resistance | |
dc.relation.uri | https://status.im/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://-curve.fi/#/ethereum/swap | |
dc.relation.uri | https://ethereum.org/en/roadmap/merge/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2102.03347 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://eigenphi.io/mev/eigentx/0xb55d4267a3565fdc8bada2638f97ed0bb31aa4.. | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1145/3517745.3561448 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1145/3558535.3559780 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://coinmetrics.io/special-insights/what-is-mev-anyway/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.05111 | |
dc.relation.uri | http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.07371 | |
dc.rights.holder | © Національний університет “Львівська політехніка”, 2023 | |
dc.subject | блокчейн | |
dc.subject | смарт-контракти | |
dc.subject | розподілені системи | |
dc.subject | однорангові мережі | |
dc.subject | криптографія | |
dc.subject | blockchain | |
dc.subject | smart contracts | |
dc.subject | distributed systems | |
dc.subject | peer-to-peer networks’ cryptography | |
dc.subject.udc | 004.75/.62 | |
dc.title | Явище maximal extractable value (MEV) в мережах блокчейн та його вплив на блокчейн екосистему | |
dc.title.alternative | Maximal extractable value (MEV) in blockchain networks and its impact on blockchain ecosys-tem | |
dc.type | Article |
Files
License bundle
1 - 1 of 1