Явище maximal extractable value (MEV) в мережах блокчейн та його вплив на блокчейн екосистему

dc.citation.epage71
dc.citation.issue2
dc.citation.journalTitleУкраїнський журнал інформаційних технологій
dc.citation.spage60
dc.citation.volume5
dc.contributor.affiliationНаціональний університет “Львівська політехніка”
dc.contributor.affiliationLviv Polytechnic National University
dc.contributor.authorЧеркас, Н. С.
dc.contributor.authorБатюк, А. Є.
dc.contributor.authorCherkas, N. S.
dc.contributor.authorBatiuk, A. Y.
dc.coverage.placenameЛьвів
dc.coverage.placenameLviv
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-01T11:06:11Z
dc.date.available2024-04-01T11:06:11Z
dc.date.created2023-02-28
dc.date.issued2023-02-28
dc.description.abstractЗ появою технології смарт контрактів в мережах блокчейн стала можливою реалізація складних протоколів децентралізованих фінансів, які з часом набули значної популярності та досягнули показника Total Value Locked (TVL) в більше ніж 150 мільярдів доларів США. Мережі блокчейн, надаючи такі гарантії як незмінність, відкритість, децентралізованість та безпека, все ж нездатні забезпечити прогнозований порядок транзакцій у вихідних блоках, що стало причиною появи явища Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) – максимальної "екстрактованої" вигоди, доступної певним учасникам мережі (майнерам, валідаторам), які мають ексклюзивну можливість впливати на впорядкування транзакцій. В даній роботі проведено ґрунтовний огляд явища MEV та з'ясовано його вплив на екосистему мереж блокчейн. Окреслено безпосередню проблему прогнозованого порядку транзакцій в мережах блокчейн, проведено огляд значної кількості наукових публікацій за темою екстракції MEV, що дало можливість здійснити ретроспективний аналіз даного явища, систематизувати його найбільш поширені прояви та проаналізувати сучасні тенденції розвитку. В ході ретроспективного аналізу, виявлено паралелі зі схожими маніпуляціями в галузі високочастотної алгоритмізованої торгівлі на класичних фінансових майданчиках та зроблено важливий висновок щодо напрямку вирішення проблеми MEV в протоколах децентралізованих фінансів. Систематизовано напрямки сучасних досліджень явища MEV, проаналізовано методи та засоби досліджень, а також наведено безпосередні приклади екстракції MEV в мережі Ethereum з існуючими оцінками її масштабів. В підсумку, виділено переважаючий негативний вплив явища MEV на мережі блокчейн і децентралізовані фінанси та на основі аналізу окремої підкатегорії існуючих публікацій виявлено відсутність, на даний момент, ефективного рішення проблеми екстракції MEV. Це своєю чергою зумовлює актуальність подальших досліджень в напрямку подолання негативних впливів MEV на мережі блокчейн та протоколи децентралізованих фінансів.
dc.description.abstractThe advent of smart contract technology in blockchain networks has ushered in a new era of possibilities for implementing complex decentralized finance protocols. Over time, these protocols have gained significant traction, reaching a Total Value Locked (TVL) of over 150 billion US dollars. While blockchain networks offer inherent benefits such as immutability, transparency, decentralization, and security, they still grapple with a critical challenge – the inability to ensure a predictable order of transactions within produced blocks. This limitation has given rise to the Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) phenomenon. MEV represents the maximum potential benefit that certain network participants, primarily miners and validators, can extract by wielding their exclusive capability to influence transaction order. In this work, we embark on an exhaustive exploration of the MEV phenomenon and delve deep into its impact on the broader blockchain ecosystem. We shed light on the pressing issue of transaction ordering in blockchain networks and provide an in-depth survey of the vast body of scholarly publications focused on MEV extraction. This comprehensive review allowed us to conduct a retrospective analysis of the MEV phenomenon, categorize its most common manifestations, and uncover current development trends. Intriguingly, during this analysis, parallels were drawn with similar manipulations witnessed in the realm of high-frequency algorithmic trading within traditional financial markets. A vital conclusion that emerged from our study pertains to possible strategies for addressing the MEV problem within decentralized finance protocols. We systematically outline the current research directions concerning MEV, explore the methodologies and tools employed in these studies, and present concrete examples of MEV extraction within the Ethereum network, accompanied by quantitative estimations. In summary, the MEV phenomenon has cast an overwhelming negative impact on blockchain networks and decentralized finance. Our analysis of existing publications within a specific subcategory reveals the current absence of an effective solution to the MEV extraction problem. This underscores the importance of further research aimed at mitigating the adverse effects of MEV on blockchain networks and decentralized finance protocols.
dc.format.extent60-71
dc.format.pages12
dc.identifier.citationЧеркас Н. С. Явище maximal extractable value (MEV) в мережах блокчейн та його вплив на блокчейн екосистему / Н. С. Черкас, А. Є. Батюк // Український журнал інформаційних технологій. — Львів : Видавництво Львівської політехніки, 2023. — Том 5. — № 2. — С. 60–71.
dc.identifier.citationenCherkas N. S. Maximal extractable value (MEV) in blockchain networks and its impact on blockchain ecosys-tem / N. S. Cherkas, A. Y. Batiuk // Ukrainian Journal of Information Technology. — Lviv : Lviv Politechnic Publishing House, 2023. — Vol 5. — No 2. — P. 60–71.
dc.identifier.doidoi.org/10.23939/ujit2023.02.060
dc.identifier.issn2707-1898
dc.identifier.urihttps://ena.lpnu.ua/handle/ntb/61605
dc.language.isouk
dc.publisherВидавництво Львівської політехніки
dc.publisherLviv Politechnic Publishing House
dc.relation.ispartofУкраїнський журнал інформаційних технологій, 2 (5), 2023
dc.relation.ispartofUkrainian Journal of Information Technology, 2 (5), 2023
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dc.rights.holder© Національний університет “Львівська політехніка”, 2023
dc.subjectблокчейн
dc.subjectсмарт-контракти
dc.subjectрозподілені системи
dc.subjectоднорангові мережі
dc.subjectкриптографія
dc.subjectblockchain
dc.subjectsmart contracts
dc.subjectdistributed systems
dc.subjectpeer-to-peer networks’ cryptography
dc.subject.udc004.75/.62
dc.titleЯвище maximal extractable value (MEV) в мережах блокчейн та його вплив на блокчейн екосистему
dc.title.alternativeMaximal extractable value (MEV) in blockchain networks and its impact on blockchain ecosys-tem
dc.typeArticle

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