Приватні військові компанії у зовнішній політиці росії: 2014–2023 роки
dc.citation.epage | 6 | |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | |
dc.citation.journalTitle | Гуманітарні візії | |
dc.citation.spage | 1 | |
dc.citation.volume | 10 | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Національний університет “Львівська політехніка” | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Lviv Polytechnic National University | |
dc.contributor.author | Івасечко, Ольга | |
dc.contributor.author | Бондар, Тетяна | |
dc.contributor.author | Ivasechko, Olha | |
dc.contributor.author | Bondar, Tetiana | |
dc.coverage.placename | Львів | |
dc.coverage.placename | Lviv | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2025-05-14T07:32:47Z | |
dc.date.created | 2024-02-27 | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-02-27 | |
dc.description.abstract | У статті сфокусовано увагу на діяльності приватних військових компаній (ПВК) російської федерації (рф) як інструмента реалізації її зовнішньої політики та геополітичних цілей. Визначено основні причини створення приватних військових компаній, їх еволюцію та ключові етапи діяльності. Проаналізовано особливості формування російських ПВК та залученість держави до підготовки особового складу компаній на початковому етапі. Подано інформацію про залучення ПВК рф до міжнародних збройних конфліктів як елемента здійснення зовнішньої політики росії. Окрім цього, у статті наведено приклади використання російських ПВК задля забезпечення зовнішньополітичних цілей та збереження російського впливу у важливих для рф регіонах. Визначено перспективи існування ПВК росії протягом наступних років. Зокрема, проаналізовано можливість перетворення ПВК на частину структури збройних сил рф, що може стати кінцем їхньої діяльності як автономних збройних формувань. Резюмовано, що ПВК рф є основним інструментом реалізації зовнішньополітичної діяльності росії у геополітично важливих для неї регіонах. Також проаналізовано, чи було їх залучення до військових конфліктів у Сирії та Лівії та розв’язана війна проти України успішними для рф у питанні реалізації поставлених завдань. | |
dc.description.abstract | The article focuses on the activities of private military companies (PMCs) of the russian federation as a tool for implementing its foreign policy and geopolitical goals. The main reasons for the creation of PMCs in russia, their evolution and key stages of activity have been identified. The peculiarities of the formation of russian PMCs and the state involvement in the training of company personnel at the initial stage have been analysed. The article also outlines the imperialist policy of the russian federation, which led to the transformation of private military companies into a part of the regular army of the russian federation. Particular attention has been paid to the goals of russia’s current foreign policy, as well as to moscow’s geopolitical interests in the Middle East, Africa and the post-Soviet countries. Information on the involvement of private military companies of the russian federation in international armed conflicts in the above-mentioned regions as an element of the implementation of russia’s foreign policy has been highlighted. In addition, the article presents examples of the use of russian PMCs to achieve foreign policy goals and maintain russian influence in regions important for it. The prospects for the existence of russia’s private military companies in the coming years have been defined. In particular, the possibility of transforming PMCs into a part of the structure of the russian armed forces, which may end their activities as separate armed formations, has been analysed. It has been summarised that private military companies of the russian federation have become the main instrument for the implementation of russia’s foreign policy in geopolitically important regions for it. The question whether their involvement in the military conflicts in Syria and Libya and the unleashed war against Ukraine were successful for the russian federation in the implementation of the tasks set has been also analysed. It has been concluded that the existence of PMCs is a serious threat to international security, and therefore there is an urgent need to take measures to prevent their further activities. | |
dc.format.extent | 1-6 | |
dc.format.pages | 6 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Івасечко О. Приватні військові компанії у зовнішній політиці росії: 2014–2023 роки / Ольга Івасечко, Тетяна Бондар // Гуманітарні візії. — Львів : Видавництво Львівської політехніки, 2024. — Том 10. — № 1. — С. 1–6. | |
dc.identifier.citationen | Ivasechko O. Private Military Companiesin Russian Foreign Policy: 2014–2023 Years / Olha Ivasechko, Tetiana Bondar // Humanitarian Vision. — Lviv : Lviv Politechnic Publishing House, 2024. — Vol 10. — No 1. — P. 1–6. | |
dc.identifier.doi | doi.org/10.23939/shv2024.01.001 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ena.lpnu.ua/handle/ntb/64567 | |
dc.language.iso | uk | |
dc.publisher | Видавництво Львівської політехніки | |
dc.publisher | Lviv Politechnic Publishing House | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Гуманітарні візії, 1 (10), 2024 | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Humanitarian Vision, 1 (10), 2024 | |
dc.relation.references | Aksyonov's Private Armies. How the Russian-occupied Crimea is Preparing for the Ukrainian Cunteroffensive. (2023). [In Ukrainian]. Ukrainska Pravda, 22th of May. Retrieved from https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/05/22/7403217/ [= Приватні армії Аксьонова 2023]. | |
dc.relation.references | Bukkvoll T., Østensen Å. G. (2020). The Emergence of Russian Private Military Companies: A New Tool of Clandestine Warfare. Special Operations Journal, 6 (1), 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2020.1740528 | |
dc.relation.references | Bukkvoll, T., Østensen, Å. G. (2021). Private Military Companies – Russian Great Power Politics on the Cheap? Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 33(1-2), 130-151. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1984709 | |
dc.relation.references | Gartner S. (2008). The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach. American Political Science Review. 102, 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080027 | |
dc.relation.references | Giedraitis, A. (2020). Private Military Companies in the Foreign and Security Policy of the Russian Federation in 2014-2019. Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review. Volume 18, Issue 1, 123-162. https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2020.18.6 | |
dc.relation.references | Gusarov, V. (2021). Russian Private Military Companies As Licensed Tool of Terror. InformNapalm. Retrieved from https://informnapalm.org/en/russian-private-military-companies-as-licensed-tool-of-terror/ | |
dc.relation.references | Gorka, M. (2023). The Wagner Group as a Tool of Russian Hybrid Warfare. Polish Political Science Yearbook, Vol. 52(2), 83-98. https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202324 | |
dc.relation.references | Horovenko, V., Tiutiunnyk, V. (2013). Private Military Companies: International experience and Possible Ways of Its Implementation in Ukraine. [In Ukrainian]. Science and Defence, №3, 32-39. [= Горовенко, Тютюнник: 2013]. | |
dc.relation.references | Kulyk, V. (2010). Russian Politics in the Post-Soviet Space. [In Ukrainian]. The Ukrainian Magazine, 9. Retrieved from http://ukrzurnal.eu/ukr.archive.html/1071/ [= Кулик 2010]. https://doi.org/10.1515/ijsl.2010.005 | |
dc.relation.references | Larsen, K., Hansen F. (2022). Russia´s comprehensive approach and the increased use of the Wagner Group challenges the West in Africa. Danish Institute for International Studies. Retrieved from https://www.diis.dk/en/research/russias-comprehensive-approach-and-the-increased-use-of-the-wagner-group-challenges-the | |
dc.relation.references | New Version of the Concept of Russia's Foreign policy: Content Analysis. (2023). [In Ukrainian]. National Institute of Strategic Studies, 4th of April. Retrieved from https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/mizhnarodni-vidnosyny/nova-redaktsiya-kontseptsiyi-zovnishnoyi-polityky-rosiyi-analiz [= Нова редакція концепції зовнішньої політики Росії: аналіз змісту 2023]. | |
dc.relation.references | PMC Rush: Russian Private Militaries. (2021). InformNapalm. Retrieved from https://informnapalm.rocks/pmc_rush | |
dc.relation.references | Private Military Companies. (2015). Armed Conflict in Ukraine: MilitarySupport for DPR and LPR Illegal Armed Groups by the Russian Federation, 25-30. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/issues/Mercenaries/WG/OtherStakeholders/ukrainian-hhru-submission-2.pdf | |
dc.relation.references | Rozumnyi, M. (Ed.). (2018). Regime of Putin: Reset-2018. [In Ukrainian]. Kyiv: NISS. [= Розумний 2018]. | |
dc.relation.references | Singer, P. (2003). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Industry. Ithaca and London: Connel University Press. | |
dc.relation.references | Sukhankin, S. (2019). “A black cat in the dark room”: Russian Quasi-Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) – ‘Non-existent,’ but Deadly and Useful, 5-9. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/40789451/A_black_cat_in_the_dark_room_Russian_Quasi_Private_Military_and_Security_Companies_PMSCs_Non_existent_but_Deadly_and_Useful | |
dc.relation.references | The European Union Announced Additional Sanctions Against PMC “Wagner”. (2023). [In Ukrainian]. Radio Liberty, 25th of February. Retrieved from https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-vagner-es-sanktsiyi/32288136.html [= ЄС оголосив додаткові санкції проти ПВК “Ваґнер”: 2023]. | |
dc.relation.references | The Seimas of Lithuania recognized PMC “Wagner” as a terrorist organization. (2023). [In Ukrainian]. Ukrinform, March 14. Retrieved from https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/3682235-sejm-litvi-viznav-pvk-vagner-teroristicnou-organizacieu.html [= Сейм Литви визнав ПВК “Ваґнер” терористичною організацією 2023]. | |
dc.relation.references | What Private Military Companies Are There in Russia and in Which Countries They Operated. (2023). [In Ukrainian]. Word and Deed: Analytical Portal. January 9. Retrieved from https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2023/01/09/infografika/svit/yaki-pryvatni-vijskovi-kompaniyi-ye-rosiyi-ta-yakyx-krayinax-vony-diyaly [= Які приватні військові компанії є в росії та в яких країнах вони діяли 2023] | |
dc.relation.references | Weber, Y. (2022). Russia's New Maritime Doctrine. Middle East Studies. Vol.13, Issue 4, August. Retrieved from https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MES-Publications/MES-Insights/Russias-New-Maritime-Doctrine/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Aksyonov's Private Armies. How the Russian-occupied Crimea is Preparing for the Ukrainian Cunteroffensive. (2023). [In Ukrainian]. Ukrainska Pravda, 22th of May. Retrieved from https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/05/22/7403217/ [= Pryvatni armii Aksonova 2023]. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Bukkvoll T., Østensen Å. G. (2020). The Emergence of Russian Private Military Companies: A New Tool of Clandestine Warfare. Special Operations Journal, 6 (1), 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2020.1740528 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Bukkvoll, T., Østensen, Å. G. (2021). Private Military Companies – Russian Great Power Politics on the Cheap? Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 33(1-2), 130-151. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1984709 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Gartner S. (2008). The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach. American Political Science Review. 102, 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080027 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Giedraitis, A. (2020). Private Military Companies in the Foreign and Security Policy of the Russian Federation in 2014-2019. Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review. Volume 18, Issue 1, 123-162. https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2020.18.6 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Gusarov, V. (2021). Russian Private Military Companies As Licensed Tool of Terror. InformNapalm. Retrieved from https://informnapalm.org/en/russian-private-military-companies-as-licensed-tool-of-terror/ | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Gorka, M. (2023). The Wagner Group as a Tool of Russian Hybrid Warfare. Polish Political Science Yearbook, Vol. 52(2), 83-98. https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202324 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Horovenko, V., Tiutiunnyk, V. (2013). Private Military Companies: International experience and Possible Ways of Its Implementation in Ukraine. [In Ukrainian]. Science and Defence, No 3, 32-39. [= Horovenko, Tiutiunnik: 2013]. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Kulyk, V. (2010). Russian Politics in the Post-Soviet Space. [In Ukrainian]. The Ukrainian Magazine, 9. Retrieved from http://ukrzurnal.eu/ukr.archive.html/1071/ [= Kulik 2010]. https://doi.org/10.1515/ijsl.2010.005 | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Larsen, K., Hansen F. (2022). Russia´s comprehensive approach and the increased use of the Wagner Group challenges the West in Africa. Danish Institute for International Studies. Retrieved from https://www.diis.dk/en/research/russias-comprehensive-approach-and-the-increased-use-of-the-wagner-group-challenges-the | |
dc.relation.referencesen | New Version of the Concept of Russia's Foreign policy: Content Analysis. (2023). [In Ukrainian]. National Institute of Strategic Studies, 4th of April. Retrieved from https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/mizhnarodni-vidnosyny/nova-redaktsiya-kontseptsiyi-zovnishnoyi-polityky-rosiyi-analiz [= Nova redaktsiia kontseptsii zovnishnoi polityky Rosii: analiz zmistu 2023]. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | PMC Rush: Russian Private Militaries. (2021). InformNapalm. Retrieved from https://informnapalm.rocks/pmc_rush | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Private Military Companies. (2015). Armed Conflict in Ukraine: MilitarySupport for DPR and LPR Illegal Armed Groups by the Russian Federation, 25-30. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/issues/Mercenaries/WG/OtherStakeholders/ukrainian-hhru-submission-2.pdf | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Rozumnyi, M. (Ed.). (2018). Regime of Putin: Reset-2018. [In Ukrainian]. Kyiv: NISS. [= Rozumnii 2018]. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Singer, P. (2003). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Industry. Ithaca and London: Connel University Press. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Sukhankin, S. (2019). "A black cat in the dark room": Russian Quasi-Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) – ‘Non-existent,’ but Deadly and Useful, 5-9. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/40789451/A_black_cat_in_the_dark_room_Russian_Quasi_Private_Military_and_Security_Companies_PMSCs_Non_existent_but_Deadly_and_Useful | |
dc.relation.referencesen | The European Union Announced Additional Sanctions Against PMC "Wagner". (2023). [In Ukrainian]. Radio Liberty, 25th of February. Retrieved from https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-vagner-es-sanktsiyi/32288136.html [= YeS oholosyv dodatkovi sanktsii proty PVK "Vagner": 2023]. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | The Seimas of Lithuania recognized PMC "Wagner" as a terrorist organization. (2023). [In Ukrainian]. Ukrinform, March 14. Retrieved from https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/3682235-sejm-litvi-viznav-pvk-vagner-teroristicnou-organizacieu.html [= Seim Lytvy vyznav PVK "Vagner" terorystychnoiu orhanizatsiieiu 2023]. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | What Private Military Companies Are There in Russia and in Which Countries They Operated. (2023). [In Ukrainian]. Word and Deed: Analytical Portal. January 9. Retrieved from https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2023/01/09/infografika/svit/yaki-pryvatni-vijskovi-kompaniyi-ye-rosiyi-ta-yakyx-krayinax-vony-diyaly [= Yaki pryvatni viiskovi kompanii ye v rosii ta v yakykh krainakh vony diialy 2023] | |
dc.relation.referencesen | Weber, Y. (2022). Russia's New Maritime Doctrine. Middle East Studies. Vol.13, Issue 4, August. Retrieved from https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MES-Publications/MES-Insights/Russias-New-Maritime-Doctrine/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/05/22/7403217/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2020.1740528 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1984709 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080027 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2020.18.6 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://informnapalm.org/en/russian-private-military-companies-as-licensed-tool-of-terror/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202324 | |
dc.relation.uri | http://ukrzurnal.eu/ukr.archive.html/1071/ | |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1515/ijsl.2010.005 | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.diis.dk/en/research/russias-comprehensive-approach-and-the-increased-use-of-the-wagner-group-challenges-the | |
dc.relation.uri | https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/mizhnarodni-vidnosyny/nova-redaktsiya-kontseptsiyi-zovnishnoyi-polityky-rosiyi-analiz | |
dc.relation.uri | https://informnapalm.rocks/pmc_rush | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/issues/Mercenaries/WG/OtherStakeholders/ukrainian-hhru-submission-2.pdf | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.academia.edu/40789451/A_black_cat_in_the_dark_room_Russian_Quasi_Private_Military_and_Security_Companies_PMSCs_Non_existent_but_Deadly_and_Useful | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-vagner-es-sanktsiyi/32288136.html | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/3682235-sejm-litvi-viznav-pvk-vagner-teroristicnou-organizacieu.html | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2023/01/09/infografika/svit/yaki-pryvatni-vijskovi-kompaniyi-ye-rosiyi-ta-yakyx-krayinax-vony-diyaly | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MES-Publications/MES-Insights/Russias-New-Maritime-Doctrine/ | |
dc.rights.holder | © Національний університет “Львівська політехніка”, 2024 | |
dc.rights.holder | © Івасечко О., Бондар Т., 2024 | |
dc.subject | приватні військові компанії | |
dc.subject | гібридна війна | |
dc.subject | зовнішня політика | |
dc.subject | геополітичні інтереси | |
dc.subject | воєнні злочини | |
dc.subject | міжнародний конфлікт | |
dc.subject | світова загроза | |
dc.subject | private military companies | |
dc.subject | hybrid warfare | |
dc.subject | foreign policy | |
dc.subject | geopolitical interests | |
dc.subject | war crimes | |
dc.subject | international conflict | |
dc.subject | world threat | |
dc.subject.udc | 327.51 | |
dc.title | Приватні військові компанії у зовнішній політиці росії: 2014–2023 роки | |
dc.title.alternative | Private Military Companiesin Russian Foreign Policy: 2014–2023 Years | |
dc.type | Article |
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