The evolution of the form of government in Italy
| dc.citation.epage | 174 | |
| dc.citation.issue | 4 (32) | |
| dc.citation.journalTitle | Вісник Національного університету “Львівська політехніка”. Серія: Юридичні науки | |
| dc.citation.spage | 167 | |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | Університет Мачерата (Італія) | |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | University of Macerata (Italy) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Козімо, Джованні ді | |
| dc.contributor.author | Cosimo, Giovanni di | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-16T08:57:27Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-03-16T08:57:27Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2021-10-10 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-10-10 | |
| dc.description.abstract | У статті аналізується еволюція парламентської форми правління, що підкреслює зростання значення правління та прогресуючу маргіналізацію парламенту. Установчі збори обрали форму парламентського правління. Вирішальним аргументом, висунутим під час обговорення на користь парламентської системи, стало занепокоєння надмірною концентрацією влади. Бажання не повторювати досвід фашистського режиму, а також завіса невігластва щодо результатів політичних виборів, які мали відбутися 18 квітня 1948 р., змусило політичні сили віддати перевагу парламентському уряду, в якому представники виконавчої та законодавчої влади були пов'язані відносинами довіри, оскільки вважалося, що це найкраще захистить тих, хто програв [1, с. 60]. Прийняття симетричної бікамералістичної системи, яка надає однакові повноваження обом палатам також можна віднести до цієї лінії міркувань. Подібні занепокоєння зумовили вибір виборчого регламенту та привели до прийняття пропорційної системи, яка достовірно відображає баланс сил між партіями, визначений виборцями на відміну від мажоритарних систем, які винагороджують політичні сили, які стали переможцями на виборах. Навіть рішення про введення нового рівня децентралізованого уряду, що знаходиться на півдорозі між державою та місцевими адміністративними органами (комунами та провінціями), можна розглядати як пов’язане з розбіжністю щодо концентрації влади. Фактично законодавча функція була розподілена по осі центр-периферія, хоча й досить нерівномірно. По суті, Установчі збори керувалися інституційними рішеннями, які зосереджувалися на збалансованому розподілі влади щодо форми правління (парламентської) форми, державної (регіональної) та виборчого закону (пропорційне представництво) [2, с. 422]. Як ми побачимо, ця орієнтація, здається, принаймні частково і різними способами, з часом була залишена. Еволюція форми правління пішла в інший напрямок, оскільки рівновага між парламентом і урядом змінилася на користь останнього. | |
| dc.description.abstract | The article analyzes the evolution of the parliamentary form of government, which highlights the growing importance of government and the progressive marginalization of Parliament. The Constituent Assembly opted for a form of parliamentary government. A decisive argument put forward during the discussion in favour of the parliamentary system was the concern over an excessive concentration of power. The wish not to repeat the experience of the fascist regime as well as the veil of ignorance regarding the result of the political elections that were to be held on 18th April, 1948 led the political forces to prefer a parliamentary government in which the executive and legislative branches were bound by a relationship of trust as this was thought to best safeguard the losers [1, p. 60]. The adoption of the symmetric bicameral system that assigns the same powers to the two chambers can also be ascribed to this line of reasoning. Similar concerns conditioned the choice of electoral regulations and led to the adoption of the proportional system which faithfully reflects the balance of power between the parties decided by the electorate, unlike the majoritarian systems that reward the political forces that emerge as winners at the polls. Even the decision to introduce a new level of decentralized government, halfway between the State and the local administrative bodies (communes and provinces) can be seen as associated with the diffidence felt towards the concentration of power. In fact, the legislative function was distributed upon the centre-periphery axis, albeit in a rather unequal way. In short, the Constituent Assembly steered towards institutional solutions that focused on the balanced distribution of power regarding the form of government (parliamentary), the form of state (regional) and the electoral law (proportional representation) [2, p. 422]. As we shall see, this orientation seems, at least partly and in various ways, to have been abandoned in the course of time. The evolution of the form of government has taken a different direction given that the equilibrium between Parliament and Government has shifted in favour of the latter. | |
| dc.format.extent | 167-174 | |
| dc.format.pages | 8 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Cosimo G. d. The evolution of the form of government in Italy / Giovanni di Cosimo // Вісник Національного університету “Львівська політехніка”. Серія: Юридичні науки. — Lviv : Lviv Politechnic Publishing House, 2021. — No 4 (32). — P. 167–174. | |
| dc.identifier.citationen | Cosimo G. d. (2021) The evolution of the form of government in Italy. Visnyk Natsionalnoho universytetu "Lvivska politekhnika". Serie: Yurydychni nauky (Lviv), no 4 (32), pp. 167-174. | |
| dc.identifier.doi | http: //doi.org/10.23939/law2021.32.167 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://ena.lpnu.ua/handle/ntb/57689 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Видавництво Львівської політехніки | |
| dc.publisher | Lviv Politechnic Publishing House | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Вісник Національного університету “Львівська політехніка”. Серія: Юридичні науки, 4 (32), 2021 | |
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| dc.relation.references | 6. On the concept of constitutional amendments cf. S. Bartole (2019). Considerazioni in tema di modificazioni costituzionalie costituzione vivente, in “Rivistaaic.it” [Considerations on the subject of constitutional amendments and the living constitution, in “Rivistaaic.it”]. No. 1. P. 335. URL: https://www.rivistaaic.it/images/fascicoli/ Rivista_AIC_Fascicolo_02_2019.pdf [in Italian]. | |
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| dc.relation.references | 8. E. Cheli (2016). La forma di governo nel disegno della riforma costituzionale, in “Astrid Rassegna” [The form of government in the design of the constitutional reform, in «Astrid Rassegna»]. No. 12. P. 2 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 9. L. Ciaurro (2019). La riduzione del numero dei parlamentari fra revisione costituzionale e opportunità politica, in “Rassegna parlamentare” [The reduction in the number of parliamentarians between constitutional revision and political opportunity, in “Parliamentary Review”]. No. 1. P. 95‒114 [in Spanish]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 10. G. Di Cosimo (2014). Chi comanda in Italia [Who commands in Italy]. Governo e Parlamento negli ultimi vent’anni, Milano, FrancoAngeli. 144 p. [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 11. Cf. G. Di Cosimo (2019). Stratagemmi governativi per monopolizzare le decisioni di finanza pubblica, in Costituzione e bilancio [Government stratagems to monopolize public finance decisions, in Constitution and budget], edited by C. Bergonzini, Milano, FrancoAngeli. P. 207 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 12. A. Cossiri (2018). Partiti e rappresentanza nella dimensione interna e sovranazionaleI fattori normative [Parties and representation in the internal and supranational dimension The normative factors], Collana Studi di Diritto Pubblico, FrancoAngeli. URL: https://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 06/cossiri.pdf [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 13. Cf. G. Di Cosimo (2019). Personale e digitale, le metamorfosi del partito, in “Forumcostituzionale.it” [Personal and digital, the metamorphosis of the party, in “Forumcostituzionale.it”]. URL: https://www.forumcostituzionale.it/ wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/dicosimo.pdf [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 14. M. Calise (2010). Il partito personale [The personal party]. I due corpi del leader, Roma-Bari, Laterza. F. Musella, Governo, leader personali e autonomia del politico, in Il governo in Italia. Profili costituzionali e dinamiche politiche, edited by F. Musella, Bologna, il Mulino, 2019. P. 248 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 15. Gerbaudo P. (2019). The Digital Party. Political Organisation and Online Democracy. London, Pluto Press. 224 р. [in English]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 16. Cf. F. Bassanini (2019). Il rapporto tra il Presidente del Consiglio e i Ministri, in “Astrid rassegna” [The relationship between the Prime Minister and the Ministers, in “Astrid review”]. No. 9. P. 45 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 17. A. Morrone (2018). Governo di cambiamento [Government of change]. URL: https://www.federalismi.it/ nv14/editoriale.cfm?eid=478&content=Governo+di+cambiamento&content_auth=%3Cb%3EAndrea+Morrone%3C/b%3E [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 18. L. Elia (2009). Costituzione, partiti, istituzioni, Bologna, il Mulino [Constitution, parties, institutions, Bologna, il Mulino]. 496 p. [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 19. G. Pasquino (2017). Potere degli elettori, rappresentanza, accountability, in “International Journal of State and Government Sciences” [Power of voters, representation, accountability, in “International Journal of State and Government Sciences”]. URL: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lWJgeQTYoPAJ: www.riceg.org/index.php/riceg/article/download/4/4/+&cd=2&hl=uk&ct=clnk&gl=ua [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.references | 20. M. Fioravanti (2008). Le due trasformazioni costituzionali dell’età repubblicana, in “Astridonline.it” [The two constitutional transformations of the republican age, in “Astridonline.it”]. No. 65. P. 12. URL: http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/Fior/Fioravanti_Lincei.pdf | |
| dc.relation.references | 21. The Court warns that “in other situations a similar reduction of the parliamentarians’constitutional function could lead to different outcomes” [The Court warns that “in other situations a similar reduction of the parliamentarians'constitutional function could lead to different outcomes”] (ord. 17/2019). | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 1. L. Paladin (2004). Per una storia costituzionale dell’Italia repubblicana [For a constitutional history of republican Italy]. Bologna, il Mulino. 61 p. [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 2. C. Ghisalberti (2010). Storia costituzionale d’Italia 1848/1994 [Constitutional history of Italy 1848/1994]. Roma-Bari, Laterza. 530 p. [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 3. S. Cassese (2014). Governare gli italiani [Governing the Italians]. Storia dello Stato. Bologna, il Mulino. 414 p. [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 4. G. Sartori (2017). La democrazia delle idee sbagliate. in "il Mulino" [The democracy of wrong ideas. in "il Mulino"]. No. 3. P. 524 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 5. L. Elia (2008). La "stabilizzazione" del governo dalla Costituente ad oggi, in "Astridonline.it" [The "stabilization" of the government from the Constituent Assembly to today, in "Astridonline.it"]. No. 63. URL:http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/elia/elia.pdf [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 6. On the concept of constitutional amendments cf. S. Bartole (2019). Considerazioni in tema di modificazioni costituzionalie costituzione vivente, in "Rivistaaic.it" [Considerations on the subject of constitutional amendments and the living constitution, in "Rivistaaic.it"]. No. 1. P. 335. URL: https://www.rivistaaic.it/images/fascicoli/ Rivista_AIC_Fascicolo_02_2019.pdf [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 7. L. Elia, La Costituzione aggredita. Forma di governo e devolution al tempo della destra [The Constitution attacked. Form of government and devolution at the time of the right], Bologna, il Mulino, 2005. URL: https://www.mulino.it/isbn/9788815109286 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 8. E. Cheli (2016). La forma di governo nel disegno della riforma costituzionale, in "Astrid Rassegna" [The form of government in the design of the constitutional reform, in "Astrid Rassegna"]. No. 12. P. 2 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 9. L. Ciaurro (2019). La riduzione del numero dei parlamentari fra revisione costituzionale e opportunità politica, in "Rassegna parlamentare" [The reduction in the number of parliamentarians between constitutional revision and political opportunity, in "Parliamentary Review"]. No. 1. P. 95‒114 [in Spanish]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 10. G. Di Cosimo (2014). Chi comanda in Italia [Who commands in Italy]. Governo e Parlamento negli ultimi vent’anni, Milano, FrancoAngeli. 144 p. [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 11. Cf. G. Di Cosimo (2019). Stratagemmi governativi per monopolizzare le decisioni di finanza pubblica, in Costituzione e bilancio [Government stratagems to monopolize public finance decisions, in Constitution and budget], edited by C. Bergonzini, Milano, FrancoAngeli. P. 207 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 12. A. Cossiri (2018). Partiti e rappresentanza nella dimensione interna e sovranazionaleI fattori normative [Parties and representation in the internal and supranational dimension The normative factors], Collana Studi di Diritto Pubblico, FrancoAngeli. URL: https://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 06/cossiri.pdf [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 13. Cf. G. Di Cosimo (2019). Personale e digitale, le metamorfosi del partito, in "Forumcostituzionale.it" [Personal and digital, the metamorphosis of the party, in "Forumcostituzionale.it"]. URL: https://www.forumcostituzionale.it/ wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/dicosimo.pdf [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 14. M. Calise (2010). Il partito personale [The personal party]. I due corpi del leader, Roma-Bari, Laterza. F. Musella, Governo, leader personali e autonomia del politico, in Il governo in Italia. Profili costituzionali e dinamiche politiche, edited by F. Musella, Bologna, il Mulino, 2019. P. 248 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 15. Gerbaudo P. (2019). The Digital Party. Political Organisation and Online Democracy. London, Pluto Press. 224 r. [in English]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 16. Cf. F. Bassanini (2019). Il rapporto tra il Presidente del Consiglio e i Ministri, in "Astrid rassegna" [The relationship between the Prime Minister and the Ministers, in "Astrid review"]. No. 9. P. 45 [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 17. A. Morrone (2018). Governo di cambiamento [Government of change]. URL: https://www.federalismi.it/ nv14/editoriale.cfm?eid=478&content=Governo+di+cambiamento&content_auth=%3Cb%3EAndrea+Morrone%3C/b%3E [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 18. L. Elia (2009). Costituzione, partiti, istituzioni, Bologna, il Mulino [Constitution, parties, institutions, Bologna, il Mulino]. 496 p. [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 19. G. Pasquino (2017). Potere degli elettori, rappresentanza, accountability, in "International Journal of State and Government Sciences" [Power of voters, representation, accountability, in "International Journal of State and Government Sciences"]. URL: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lWJgeQTYoPAJ: www.riceg.org/index.php/riceg/article/download/4/4/+&cd=2&hl=uk&ct=clnk&gl=ua [in Italian]. | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 20. M. Fioravanti (2008). Le due trasformazioni costituzionali dell’età repubblicana, in "Astridonline.it" [The two constitutional transformations of the republican age, in "Astridonline.it"]. No. 65. P. 12. URL: http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/Fior/Fioravanti_Lincei.pdf | |
| dc.relation.referencesen | 21. The Court warns that "in other situations a similar reduction of the parliamentarians’constitutional function could lead to different outcomes" [The Court warns that "in other situations a similar reduction of the parliamentarians'constitutional function could lead to different outcomes"] (ord. 17/2019). | |
| dc.relation.uri | http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/elia/elia.pdf | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://www.rivistaaic.it/images/fascicoli/ | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://www.mulino.it/isbn/9788815109286 | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/ | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://www.forumcostituzionale.it/ | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://www.federalismi.it/ | |
| dc.relation.uri | http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lWJgeQTYoPAJ: | |
| dc.relation.uri | http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/Fior/Fioravanti_Lincei.pdf | |
| dc.rights.holder | © Giovani Di Cosimo, 2021 | |
| dc.subject | парламентська форма правління | |
| dc.subject | дві фази | |
| dc.subject | слабка раціоналізація | |
| dc.subject | парламент та уряд | |
| dc.subject | суб’єкти трансформації | |
| dc.subject | зміцнення уряду | |
| dc.subject | два сценарії | |
| dc.subject | parliamentary government | |
| dc.subject | two phases | |
| dc.subject | weak rationalization | |
| dc.subject | parliament and government | |
| dc.subject | parties in transformation | |
| dc.subject | alternation in government | |
| dc.subject | strengthening the Government | |
| dc.subject | two scenarios | |
| dc.subject.udc | 342.33 | |
| dc.title | The evolution of the form of government in Italy | |
| dc.title.alternative | Еволюція форми правління в Італії | |
| dc.type | Article |