Досвід ядерних переговорів з Іраном у 2013–2015 роках: уроки для адміністрації Джо Байдена

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dc.citation.epage21
dc.citation.issue2
dc.citation.spage16
dc.contributor.affiliationМідлберійський Інститут міжнародних досліджень
dc.contributor.affiliationMiddlebury Institute of International Studies
dc.contributor.authorЧебан, Олександр
dc.contributor.authorCheban, Oleksandr
dc.coverage.placenameЛьвів
dc.coverage.placenameLviv
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-10T09:47:05Z
dc.date.available2023-05-10T09:47:05Z
dc.date.created2021-02-25
dc.date.issued2021-02-25
dc.description.abstractНаголошено на важливості вирішення проблеми іранської ядерної програми під час президентства Джо Байдена і запропоновано використати досвід минулих ядерних переговорів з Іраном, щоб знайти вирішення цього питання. Зазначено, що її метою є проаналізувати досвід ведення минулих переговорів щодо врегулювання проблеми іранської ядерної програми та перспективи практичного застосування цього досвіду для вирішення цієї проблеми у майбутньому. Застосовано метод системного аналізу, метод порівняльного аналізу та метод контент-аналізу. Розглянуто досвід переговорів з Іраном щодо його ядерної програми, які відбувалися у 2013–2015 роках та успішно завершилися підписанням ядерної угоди з Іраном – Спільним всеосяжним планом дій (СВПД). Зроблено висновок, що передумови для ядерних переговорів з Іраном усередині 2010-х років значно відрізнялися від ситуація довкола іранської ядерної програми, яка склалася на початку 2020-х років і на початку президентства Джо Байдена. Зазначено, що, на відміну від середини 2010-х років, на початку 2020-х років міжнародна спільнота і навіть союзники країн НАТО не мали єдиної позиції щодо іранської ядерної програми, і крім того, адміністрація Джо Байдена зіткнулася з розвинутішою і сучаснішою ракетно-космічною програмою Ірану, ніж адміністрація Барака Обами. Доведено, що ці дві головні перешкоди (відсутність єдиної міжнародної позиції щодо іранської ядерної програми і знано розвиненіша ракетна програма) завадили адміністрації Джо Байдена повернути США до СВПД одразу після президентської інавгурації у січні 2021 року. Зазначено також іншу перешкоду для відновлення СВПД, а саме: регіональну політику Ірану, яка шкодить інтересам США, а також їхнім партнерам на Близькому Сході. Згадано, що ця перешкода вже була за президентства Барака Обами і не завадила досягнути СВПД. Зроблено припущення, що подібним чином адміністрація Джо Байдена могла б відкласти вирішення регіональних суперечностей з Іраном з метою закрити принаймні ядерне питання. Згадано, що незабаром минає термін дії деяких пунктів СВПД і це відкриває можливість для початку уже на цьому етапі переговорів щодо нової ядерної угоди з Іраном.
dc.description.abstractThe article stresses on the importance to solve the problem of Iran’s nuclear program during Joe Biden’s presidency and suggests using the experience of the past nuclear talks with Iran to find a solution of this issue. The article notes that its purpose is to analyze the experience of past negotiations on resolving the problem of Iran’s nuclear program and the prospects of practical application of this experience to solve this problem in the future. The method of system analysis, method of comparative analysis and method of content analysis were used in the article. The article considers the experience of the negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program that took place in 2013 – 2015 and successfully ended by signing the nuclear deal with Iran – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It is analyzed in the article what the lessons could be drawn from those past negotiations and how these lessons could be used by President Joe Biden and other western leaders to achieve a good nuclear deal with Iran. It is concluded that the preconditions for the nuclear talks with Iran in the mid-2010s significantly differed from the situation around Iran’s nuclear program in the early 2020s and at the beginning of Joe Biden’s presidency. The article mentions that unlike in the mid-2010s, in the early 2020s the international community and even the NATO allies did not have a united position toward Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, Joe Biden’s administration faced much more developed and modernized Iran’s missile and space program than Barak Obama’s administration did. The article proves that those two main obstacles (absence of the united international position regarding Iran’s nuclear program and much more developed missile program) hindered Joe Biden’s administration to bring the United States back to the JCPOA immediately after presidential inauguration in January 2021. The article also mentions another obstacle for recovering JCPOA – Iran’s regional policy that harms US interests as well as the interests of US partners in the Middle East. It is reminded in the article that that obstacle was already present during Barak Obama’s presidency and did not hinder to achieve the JCPOA. The article supposes that in a similar way Joe Biden’s administration could postpone solving the regional contradictions with Iran in order to close at least nuclear issue at the beginning. It is reminded in the article that some provisions of the JCPOA will expire soon, and this opens an opportunity to start already now negotiating the new nuclear deal with Iran that would take into account concerns regarding Iran’s missile program and its regional policy.
dc.format.extent16-21
dc.format.pages6
dc.identifier.citationCheban O. Experience of the Nuclear Negotiations with Iran in 2013-2015: Lessons for Joe Biden’s Administration / Oleksandr Cheban // Humanitarian Vision. — Lviv : Lviv Politechnic Publishing House, 2021. — Vol 7. — No 2. — P. 16–21.
dc.identifier.citationenCheban O. Experience of the Nuclear Negotiations with Iran in 2013-2015: Lessons for Joe Biden’s Administration / Oleksandr Cheban // Humanitarian Vision. — Lviv : Lviv Politechnic Publishing House, 2021. — Vol 7. — No 2. — P. 16–21.
dc.identifier.doidoi.org/10.23939/shv2021.02.016
dc.identifier.urihttps://ena.lpnu.ua/handle/ntb/59096
dc.language.isoua
dc.publisherВидавництво Львівської політехніки
dc.publisherLviv Politechnic Publishing House
dc.relation.ispartofHumanitarian Vision, 2 (7), 2021
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dc.rights.holder© Національний університет “Львівська політехніка”, 2021
dc.rights.holder© Чебан О., 2021
dc.subjectядерна програма Ірану
dc.subjectнерозповсюдження ядерної зброї
dc.subjectСпільний всеосяжний план дій
dc.subjectядерні переговори з Іраном
dc.subjectIran’s nuclear program
dc.subjectnonproliferation of nuclear weapons
dc.subjectJoint Comprehensive plan of Action (JCPOA)
dc.subjectnuclear negotiation
dc.subject.udc327(55).623
dc.titleДосвід ядерних переговорів з Іраном у 2013–2015 роках: уроки для адміністрації Джо Байдена
dc.title.alternativeExperience of the Nuclear Negotiations with Iran in 2013-2015: Lessons for Joe Biden’s Administration
dc.typeArticle

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Humanitarian Vision. – 2021. – Vol. 7, No. 2