Rationality in decision-making within interorganisational networks
dc.citation.epage | 14 | |
dc.citation.issue | 2 | |
dc.citation.spage | 9 | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Lviv Polytechnic National University | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland) | |
dc.contributor.author | Danylovych-Kropyvnytska, M. | |
dc.contributor.author | Limański, A. | |
dc.coverage.placename | Lviv | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-05-31T08:20:35Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-05-31T08:20:35Z | |
dc.date.created | 2017 | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.description.abstract | A networking structure is a natural phase in the evolution of organisational forms. An organisational form of a network is a set of interconnected structures and technological elements, i.e. individual economic agents, cultural and social values that arrange inter-organisational relations in a certain order and make network processes operate in a systemlike fashion. Effective joint work in inter-organisational networks suggests a need for a common goal, which is perceived to be a critical factor for joint activities. The paper studies the rationality of decisionmaking for inter-organisational networks. The analysis of behaviour within inter-organisational networks that consist of agents, like firms, entrepreneurs, governmental authorities, scientific centres, proves that group decisions are not always an optimal method to achieve a goal. There are certain tasks and circumstances when an authoritarian approach to problem solving is more sensible. It analyses a formalized model for joint choice, prevailing practice and rationality of group decisionmaking in order to reach a strategic balance within a network. The study summarizes key advantages and drawbacks in case a decision is made by a group. | |
dc.format.extent | 9-14 | |
dc.format.pages | 6 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Danylovych-Kropyvnytska M. Rationality in decision-making within interorganisational networks / M. Danylovych-Kropyvnytska, A. Limański // Economics, Entrepreneurship, Management. — Lviv : Lviv Politechnic Publishing House, 2017. — Vol 4. — No 2. — P. 9–14. | |
dc.identifier.citationen | Danylovych-Kropyvnytska M. Rationality in decision-making within interorganisational networks / M. Danylovych-Kropyvnytska, A. Limański // Economics, Entrepreneurship, Management. — Lviv : Lviv Politechnic Publishing House, 2017. — Vol 4. — No 2. — P. 9–14. | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2312-3435 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ena.lpnu.ua/handle/ntb/41304 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Lviv Politechnic Publishing House | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Economics, Entrepreneurship, Management, 2 (4), 2017 | |
dc.relation.references | 1. Levine, J. M. & Moreland, R. L (1998). Small groups. The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th ed., Vol. 2, P. 415–469. | |
dc.relation.references | 2. Bornstein, G. & Yaniv, I. (1998). Individual and group behaviour in the ultimatum games: are groups more “rational” players. Experimental Economics, Vol. 1, P. 101–108. | |
dc.relation.references | 3. Cox, J. C. (2002). Trust, reciprocity and otherregarding preferences: groups vs. individuals and males vs. females. Avoidances in Experimental Business Research, Vol. 108, P. 331–350. | |
dc.relation.references | 4. Blinder, A. S. & Morgan, J. (2005). Are two heads better than one? An experimental analysis of group vs. individual decision making. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 7, P. 183–191. | |
dc.relation.references | 5. Cason, T. N. & Mui, V.-L. (1997). A laboratory study of group polarisation in the team dictator game. Economic Journal, Vol. 107, P. 1465–1483. | |
dc.relation.references | 6. Kozeletsky, Iu. (1979). Psychological theory of decisions. Moscow: Progress. | |
dc.relation.references | 7. Diev, V. S. Joint decisions: pros & cons. Retrieved from www.philosophy.nsc.ru. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | 1. Levine, J. M. & Moreland, R. L (1998). Small groups. The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th ed., Vol. 2, P. 415–469. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | 2. Bornstein, G. & Yaniv, I. (1998). Individual and group behaviour in the ultimatum games: are groups more "rational" players. Experimental Economics, Vol. 1, P. 101–108. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | 3. Cox, J. C. (2002). Trust, reciprocity and otherregarding preferences: groups vs. individuals and males vs. females. Avoidances in Experimental Business Research, Vol. 108, P. 331–350. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | 4. Blinder, A. S. & Morgan, J. (2005). Are two heads better than one? An experimental analysis of group vs. individual decision making. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 7, P. 183–191. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | 5. Cason, T. N. & Mui, V.-L. (1997). A laboratory study of group polarisation in the team dictator game. Economic Journal, Vol. 107, P. 1465–1483. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | 6. Kozeletsky, Iu. (1979). Psychological theory of decisions. Moscow: Progress. | |
dc.relation.referencesen | 7. Diev, V. S. Joint decisions: pros & cons. Retrieved from www.philosophy.nsc.ru. | |
dc.rights.holder | © Національний університет "Львівська політехніка", 2017 | |
dc.subject | inter-organisational networks | |
dc.subject | rationality | |
dc.subject | decision-making procedures | |
dc.subject | strategic balance | |
dc.subject | cooperative game | |
dc.subject | coalition | |
dc.subject.udc | 65.012.123 | |
dc.title | Rationality in decision-making within interorganisational networks | |
dc.type | Article |
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